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Abstract
Despite all our great advances in science, technology and financial innovations, many soci-
eties today are struggling with a financial, economic and public spending crisis, over-regulation,
and mass unemployment, as well as lack of sustainability and innovation. Can we still rely on
conventional economic thinking or do we need a new approach? Is our economic system under-
going a fundamental transformation? Are our theories still doing a good job with just a few
exceptions, or do they work only for “good weather” but not for “market storms”? Can we fix
existing theories by adapting them a bit, or do we need a fundamentally different approach?
These are the kind of questions that will be addressed in this paper.
I argue that, as the complexity of socio-economic systems increases, networked decision-
making and bottom-up self-regulation will be more and more important features. It will be
explained why, besides the “homo economicus” with strictly self-regarding preferences, natural
selection has also created a “homo socialis” with other-regarding preferences. While the “homo
economicus” optimizes the own prospects in separation, the decisions of the “homo socialis”
are self-determined, but interconnected, a fact that may be characterized by the term “net-
worked minds”. Notably, the “homo socialis” manages to earn higher payoffs than the “homo
economicus”.
I show that the “homo economicus” and the “homo socialis” imply a different kind of
dynamics and distinct aggregate outcomes. Therefore, next to the traditional economics for
the “homo economicus” (“economics 1.0”), a complementary theory must be developed for
the “homo socialis”. This economic theory might be called “economics 2.0” or “socionomics”.
The names are justified, because the Web 2.0 is currently promoting a transition to a new
market organization, which benefits from social media platforms and could be characterized as
“participatory market society”.
To thrive, the “homo socialis” requires suitable institutional settings such a particular kinds
of reputation systems, which will be sketched in this paper. I also propose a new kind of money,
so-called “qualified money”, which may overcome some of the problems of our current financial
system.
In summary, I discuss the economic literature from a new perspective and argue that this
offers the basis for a different theoretical framework. This opens the door for a new economic
thinking and a novel research field, which focuses on the effects, implications, and institutional
requirements for global-scale network interactions and highly interdependent decisions.
Keywords: homo economicus — homo socialis — self-regulation — reputation systems —
qualified money — FuturICT initiative — sustainability — innovation — employment — Web 2.0
— social media
1 Introduction
In the past decades, our world has changed more quickly than ever. Globalization and technological
revolutions have created a world with many systemic interdependencies, high connectivities, and
great complexity. The nature and intensities of many 21st century problems are an immediate
consequence of this (Helbing, 2013a). However, we lack a “Global Systems Science” to understand
the world we have created, and many of our institutions are conceptually outdated.
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In fact, the intellectual framework of the current institutions of our socio-economic system is
around 300 years old for example the work of Adam Smith (1776) on the “Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations”. Many attribute to him the idea of an “invisible hand” that coordinates in-
dividual interests by self-organization. Specifically, it is often believed that optimally self-regarding
behavior, as assumed by the standard microeconomic paradigm of the “homo economicus”, would
create maximum social welfare. This idea goes back to the so-called Fable of Bees (Mandeville,
appeared as book in 1714) and is the basis of neoclassical economics.1 Even today, many policies
are founded on it, including those that demand homogeneous and free global markets.2
In fact, it can be shown that the “invisible hand” works well, if all conditions assumed by
the First Theory of Welfare Economics are fulfilled (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1959).
However, under many realistic conditions at least one of the assumptions is not satisfied so that
the welfare-optimal outcome is not guaranteed. This is, for example, the case if individuals interact
in networks rather than through one homogeneous market, or if externalities or transaction costs
matter (Coase, 1960; Roca et al., 2012). Such conditions can lead to “market failures”. The same
applies to information asymmetries or cases with powerful monopolists or oligopolists (Akerlof,
1970; Mas-Collel et al., 1995).
It is therefore understandable that Thomas Hobbes (1651) pointed out, a selfish species would
require regulation. In order to create socio-economic order, he proposed that a “Leviathan”— a
powerful state to tame the “selfish beast”.3 Even today, this constitutes the intellectual framework
of the need of top-down regulation, as it also shows up in Keynesianism. So, is the idea of a
decentrally self-organizing economy flawed? On the contrary, we have just not learned, how self-
regulation, i.e. bottom-up regulation, can work.4
The idea of self-organization is still extremely appealing and timely (Ho¨lldobler and Wilson,
2008). Ants, for example, work in an entirely self-organized and largely decentralized way without
a hierarchical system of command. The same applies to social animals like termites, flocks of
birds, or schools of fish. The ecological and immune systems also function in a decentralized and
highly efficient way, due to the evolutionary principles of mutation and selection. Social norms are
success principles building on decentralized mechanisms as well. I will argue that we can learn from
principles like these to make the “invisible hand” work, such that individual and social benefits can
be simultaneoulsy reached.
It is a great scientific challenge to find principles of self-regulation that work under less optimistic
conditions than those assumed by the Theorems of Welfare Economics. In particular, they should
work in case of social dilemma situations, where cooperative behavior would be beneficial for ev-
eryone, but where exploiting others can create even higher individual payoffs. I would like to point
out that social dilemma situations are expected to be common in socio-economic systems, since op-
portunities to reach higher benefits by overpriced low-quality products or services or by misleading
information exist in many economic exchange situations. For example, the value of a product might
be lower, or the risk of a financial derivative might be higher than claimed. Under such conditions,
cooperation can easily erode, leading to “tragedies of the commons”. Well-known examples are
environmental pollution, overfishing, global warming, free-riding, and tax evasion. The breakdown
of trust and cooperation may also be seen as the main cause of the financial meltdown of 2008, i.e.
it could also be interpreted as “tragedy of the commons” (Helbing, 2013a).
Therefore, to be successful, societies must be able to deal with “social dilemma situations”.
Unfortunately, the self-regarding behavior of a “homo economicus” (as reflected by a “best response
rule” in our later discussion), is destined to lead to “tragedies of the commons”. The current
solution to this is to introduce taxes and regulations that change the nature of the interactions
and eliminate the occurence of social dilemma situations (Helbing and Lozano, 2010). But is this
approach effective, and is it the best solution? The de facto failure of the international carbon tax
raises doubts that it does. So, is a totally different approach required?
It is often assumed that other-regarding behaviour is at the cost of personal disadvantage. If so,
due to the merciless forces of natural selection, nothing other than a self-regarding “homo economi-
cus” should exist. In Sec. 3 I will present computer simulations that test this assumption. Sur-
1Note, however, that the bees belonging to a hive have basically identical genes, such that their interests are
expected to be aligned from the perspective of evolutionary competition.
2This includes, for example, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
3The famous quote “homo hominis lupus” compares humans with wolves.
4Here, the term “self-organization” is used for the emergence of collective behavior or properties, which may be
desireable or not. “Self-regulation” is used for a set of rules that supports the adaptive self-organization of a favorable
outcome such as the convergence to a system-optimal state.
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prisingly, biological evolution can also be shown to produce a “homo socialis” with other-regarding
preferences, which may overcome “tragedies of the commons”.5
However, this type of actor cannot thrive well in an institutional framework created for a “homo
economicus”. The “homo socialis” requires different institutions. So, what institutions do we need
in the 21st century?
In the past, societies have invented various institutions to overcome “tragedies of the commons”,
for example, genetic favoritism, direct reciprocity (“I help you, if you help me”), or punitive institu-
tions (such as police, courts, prisons and regulatory authorities). However, all of these mechanisms
can lead to undesirable side effects such as civil wars or corruption. Our current system is built on
punitive institutions, but such top-down regulation is very costly and creates many inefficiencies,
including negative impacts on innovation (Cooke, 2009; Saviotti and Frenken, 2008; Hidalgo et al.,
2007; Helbing et al., 2005).6
In Sec. 5.1, I will explain that, as systems get more and more complex, top-down regulation can
no longer achieve efficient and satisfactory solutions. Instead, we can build on self-regulation, such
as found in ecological, social and immune systems. I will illustrate the advantage of this approach
by the example of urban traffic light control and will argue that a global reputation platform could
become a suitable institution for our globalized world, the “global village” that we have created
(see Sec. 6.2). This proposed approach supports trusted exchange, and increases opportunities for
the participation of citizens in social, economic and political life. Furthermore, I will present the
idea of a new, reputation-based kind of money, which I call “qualified money” (see Sec. 6.3). These
new institutions would promote an “economy 2.0”, which will be a “participatory market society”,
and help to overcome the current gap between social and economic engagement (see Sec. 7).
My overall conclusion is that a change from an agent-oriented to an interaction-oriented view
by decision-makers offers a better understanding of complex socio-economic systems, and leads to
new solutions for long-standing problems. I will cite examples from the technology and business
world, that demonstrate that the transition to a “participatory market society”, is already occuring.
This is fueled by the digital revolution, particularly the Web 2.0 and social media platforms. If
the right political decisions are taken pro-actively, this scenario can unleash the potentials of many
“networked minds” and lead to an age of creativity and sustainable prosperity.
2 A Paradigm Shift in Economic Thinking?
Like mathematics and physics, economics is proud of having an axiomatic foundation, and rightly
so. In microeconomics, which focuses on the decision-making of actors such as individuals or firms,
the paradigm of the self-regarding, optimizing agent prevails (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944). It also forms the basis of the theory of markets (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). In essence, in
macroeconomics there are basically two major competing schools: the Neoliberals who believe in
free markets (Walras, 1877; Marshall, 1890; Lucas and Sargent, 1979) and the Keynesians who call
for market regulation by politics (Keynes, 1936; Mankiw and Romer, 1991). These theories still
dominate much of public economic thinking and policy-making around the world. However, there
are a number of unresolved issues (Krugman, 2009; Colander et al., 2009; Kirman, 2010b; Haldane
and May, 2011; Lux and Westerhoff, 2009; Johnson and Lux, 2011; Ormerod and Helbing, 2012;
Helbing and Kirman, 2013; Helbing and Balietti, 2010):
1. The two macroscopic schools have incompatible views of economics (Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1987; Keen, 2013).
5Note that Adam Smith himself believed more in a competitive, but other-regarding human being, than in a
maximising self-regarding “homo economicus”. In his book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759) he writes:
“How ever selfish man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it. Of this kind is
pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive
it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious
to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by
no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility.
The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without.” Considering this,
one might conclude that Adam Smith’s concept of humans and how an economy would self-organize has still not
been fully formalized by mainstream economics or practically implemented.
6Some of the leading industrial countries now have debts around 100% of the GDP, which suggests that systems
with many institutions for top-down regulation are very expensive and may not be sustainable on the long run.
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2. A consistent theoretical link between micro- and macroeconomics (which goes beyond the
simplifying view of representative agent modeling) is lacking (Kirman, 1992).
3. Empirical and experimental findings are challenging some of the foundational assumptions of
economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996; Hartley, 1997;
Selten, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003; Ariely, 2009).
4. The prevailing microeconomic view of decision-making is not well compatible and integrated
within the body of knowledge collected in anthropology, social psychology and sociology
(Lindenberg, 1990; Gintis, 2009a; McFadden, 2012).
5. The financial crisis has raised serious doubts that the most established economic theories
can sufficiently describe financial meltdowns of markets and their impact on economies and
societies (Colander et al., 2009; Kirman, 2010b; Keen, 2011; Gersbach and Rochet, 2012;
Dewatripont and Tirole, 2012; Keen, 2013).
Are we perhaps facing economic problems, because our theoretical picture of economies does
not fit reality well? To answer this, scientists need to question established knowledge. In fact, many
new approaches have been proposed in the past decades. Due to spatial limitations I can mention
only a few. For example, I would refer to the work of Brian Arthur on innovation (1989, 1999),
of Reinhard Selten in experimental economics (1998), of Joseph Stiglitz on economic downturns
(2011), of Paul Krugman on the role of geography (1990), of Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky
on risk perception (1979, 1984, 1992, 1996), of George Akerlof and Robert Shiller on herding
behavior (“animal spirits”, see Akerlof and Shiller (2010)), of Gerd Gigerenzer (1999) on heuristics,
of Bruno Frey (2008) on happiness, of Ernst Fehr on fairness (1999, 2003), of Herbert Gintis on
evolutionary game theory (2009), of Ulrich Witt on evolutionary economics (1998), and of Alan
Kirman and Mauro Gallegati on the role of heterogeneity and non-representative agents in economics
(Kirman, 2006; Gallegati and Kirman, 1999; Kirman and Zimmermann, eds, 2001; Delli Gatti et al.,
2008). I would also mention work presenting a complexity science perspective on economic systems
(Krugman, 1996; Day, 1999; Auyang, 1999; Faggini and Lux, 2009; Kirman, 2010a; Brock and
Hommes, 1997; Lux and Marchesi, 1999; Helbing and Balietti, 2010; Keen, 2013) or an econophysics
perspective (Aoki and Yoshikawa, 2006; Bouchaud and Potters, 2000; Sornette, 2004; Sinha et al.,
2011; Chatterjee and Chakrabarti, 2007; Chakrabarti et al., eds, 2006). So far, however, a unifying
theoretical framework of all these important findings and their derivation from first principles is
largely lacking, in contrast to mainstream economics. Perhaps for this reason, many foundational
economics courses still suggest that markets can be understood as if people behaved according to
the idealized assumptions of mainstream economics.7 It, therefore, seems that most economic work
still views man as an – in many ways – imperfect approximation of a “homo economicus”, and that
these imperfections would more or less average out on the macro-level.
In response to the low predictive power of many economic theories and the economic problems
most countries face today, it is often argued that mainstream economic principles are idealizations
rather than a faithful representation of the real world. This calls for a better understanding of the
deviations between currently established theories on the one hand, and empirical or experimental
evidence on the other. Perhaps it even requires a fundamentally new way of thinking.
In fact, many eminent thinkers call for a different approach. They include Nobel prize laure-
ates and ex-presidents of central banks. The most explicit statements are probably those of Paul
Krugman, who in 2009 asked: “How did economists get it so wrong?”, and Alan Greenspan, who
acknowledged in testimony before a congressional committee on October 23, 2008, that “the whole
intellectual edifice ... collapsed in the summer of last year”. For more quotes see Helbing and
Balietti (2010) and Helbing and Kirman (2013). In adddition, most financial traders do not seem
to apply nor believe in scholarly economics. George Soros has established an Institute of New Eco-
nomic Thinking8, Edward Fullbrock and others have founded the World Economics Association to
support heterodox economics with journals such as Real-World Economics Review.9
While theories in microeconomics are mostly based on the concept of the “homo economicus”, it
must also be recognized that identical macro-level phenomena might be explained by different kinds
7The book by Bowles et al. (2005) appears to be an exception.
8See http://ineteconomics.org
9See http://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org and http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview
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of micro-level assumptions, as much relevant information is lost through macro-level aggregation
(Helbing, 2010). There are alternative micro-level theories which are worth considering (Gintis,
2009a). For example, rather than taking the “homo economicus” as a theoretical starting point,
it would be equally justified to start from the “homo socialis”, i.e. decision-makers with other-
regarding preferences (see Sec.3).
While there is empirical evidence for other-regarding behavior (Gu¨th et al., 1982; Henrich et
al., 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Frey, 2008) and some theoretical implications of this have
been studied (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Sobel, 2009), a good theoretical foundation of the “homo
socialis” has long been lacking. Recent theoretical progress (Grund et al., 2013), however, suggests
that a theory for the “homo socialis” can be rigorously derived from first principles, rooted in the
best response rule (utility maximization) and principles of evolution (see Sec.3). This raises the
pertinent question whether such a theory might better explain empirical and experimental evidence,
and perhaps create a paradigm shift in economic thinking in due course.10
For example, the fact that the “homo socialis” is influenced by the interests and preferences of
others explains a mysterious, but widely observed fact in sociology, namely social influence (Asch,
1951, 1956). Social influence helps to understand typical characteristics of opinion formation (Ma¨s et
al., 2010) and herding effects (“animal spirits”), including bubbles and crashes at financial markets
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2010; Smith et al., 1988; Caginalp et al., 2001; Hommes et al., 2005, 2008;
Sornette, 2004).
I would also expect that the incorpration of the theory of the “homo socialis” will provide a
new insights and a fundamentally new understanding of social capital, power, reputation, trust as
well as economic value (Lin, 2010), as these quantities result from social network interactions. Such
network interactions are characteristic for the “homo socialis”, who is perhaps best characterized
by the term “networked minds” (see below). I expect that a theory of the “homo socialis” will be
able to consistently explain many “puzzles” in the social sciences and economics. Currently, we still
know little about the “homo socialis”, but what we do know is very interesting. Therefore, there is
much exciting research to be done. I argue that the “homo socialis” would justify a new branch of
economics that one might call “economics 2.0” or “socionomics” (see Sec. 5).11 So, what exactly
is the “homo socialis” about?
3 The Emergence of the “Homo Socialis”
Establishing a new economic thinking is not just obstructed by a lack of alternative (“heterodox”)
models. If one departs from the concept of the “homo economicus”, i.e. the strictly optimizing
self-regarding agent, there are myriads of possibilities how agents and their decision-making rules
may be defined. However, no alternative model stands out thus far, and a consensus on a non-
homo-economicus-kind of model has not emerged. In some sense, there is too much arbitrariness
in specifying such models. But this might just have changed.
3.1 Utility-Maximizing Agents Under Evolutionary Pressure
A recently published paper (Grund et al., 2013) studied whether evolution has made humans “nasty”
(self-regarding) or “nice” (other-regarding)12. It analyzes social dilemma situations for the typical
example of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma game” (PD), which distinguishes two kinds of behavior: “co-
operation” and “defection”. The PD takes into account the risk of cooperation and the temptation
to defect.
For Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions, cooperative behavior is irrational for a “homo economicus”,
resulting in a “tragedy of the commons” with poor payoffs (Hardin, 1968). To stabilize cooperation,
social mechanisms such as direct, indirect, spatial or network reciprocity, group competition, or
costly punishment have been proposed, often assuming imitation of better-performing behaviors
(Gintis, 2009b; Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 1995; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). These mechanisms, like
taxes, effectively transform the Prisoner’s Dilemma into other kinds of games that are more favorable
10Empirical evidence suggests that more than 60% of subjects have other-regarding preferences (Murphy et al.,
2011), but the percentage may also depend on the socio-cultural background.
11Note that the methodological approach and scientific understanding proposed in this paper has little overlap
with the current, mood-focused approach by Prechter et al. (September 27, 2012), see http://www.socionomics.net/.
12See also the related article in the Wall Street Journal of 29.03.2013: http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324105204578384930047065520.html.
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for cooperation (Helbing and Lozano, 2010). So far, however, other-regarding preferences13 were
lacking a convincing explanation.14
The above mentioned study (Grund et al., 2013) distinguishes individual preferences from be-
havior. It investigates Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions in two-dimensional space on the basis of
very few assumptions, each of which promotes self-regarding preferences or defection:
1. Agents decide according to a best-response rule that strictly maximizes their utility function,
given the behaviors of their interaction partners (their neighbors).
2. The utility function considers not only the own payoff, but gives a certain weight to the
payoff of their interaction partner(s). The weight is called the “friendliness” and set to zero
for everyone at the beginning of the simulation.
3. Friendliness is a trait that is inherited (either genetically or by education) to offspring. The
likelihood to have an offspring increases exclusively with the own payoff, not the utility func-
tion. The payoff is assumed to be zero, when a friendly agent is exploited by all neighbors
(i.e. if they all defect). Therefore, such agents will never have any offspring.
4. The inherited friendliness value tends to be that of the parent. There is also a certain mutation
rate, but it does not promote friendliness. (In the simulation results discussed here, mutations
were specified such that they imply an average friendliness of 0.2, which cannot explain the
typically observed value of 0.4.)
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Figure 1: Emergence of the “homo socialis” in a world initially dominated by the “homo
economicus”.
(A) Average value of the friendliness and of the proportion of cooperating agents as a function of
time. One generation corresponds to 1β update time steps, where β is the death rate.
(B) Average payoffs of cooperators and defectors as a function of time. At the beginning, defectors
are more successful than cooperators, as they receive higher payoffs on average. However, after
many generations, a transition from a “homo economics” to a “homo socialis” occurs. Then, the
payoffs for cooperating agents (which are of the type “homo socialis”) are higher than the payoffs
of defectors. This allows the “homo socialis” to spread thanks to a reproduction rate that is now
higher than that of the “homo economicus”. Note that the population dynamics implies that
families might die out before high levels of cooperation are reached. For details of the underlying
simulations see the caption of Fig. 2 and Grund et al. (2013).
Based on the above assumptions, the characteristic outcome of the evolutionary game-theoretical
computer simulations is a self-regarding, payoff-maximizing “homo economicus”, as expected. But
this applies only to most parameter combinations. When offspring tend to live close to their parents
(i.e. intergenerational migration is low), a friendly “homo socialis” with other-regarding preferences
13not to be confused with other-regarding behavior, which is the same as cooperation
14i.e. an explanation, which does not assume favorable but debatable mechanisms such as genetic drift or cultural
selection (in the sense of a social modification of the reproduction rate)
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results instead, see Fig. 1.15 This is quite surprising, since the above assumptions do not favor
such an outcome. None of these rules promotes other-regarding preferences or cooperation in
separation (i.e. they might be considered socially dysfunctional), but they are nevertheless creating
socially favorable behavior in combination. This can only be explained as result of an interaction
effect between the above rules. Another interesting finding is the evolution of “cooperation between
strangers” (see Fig. 2), i.e. the emergence of the “homo socialis” does not require genetic favoritism.
How can we understand this outcome? Mutations generate a certain level of friendliness by
chance (“mutations”). This slight other-regarding preference (eventually giving the payoff of others
an average weight of about 0.2) creates conditionally cooperative behavior, as postulated by Fehr
and others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). That is, if enough neighbors cooperate, a “conditional
cooperator” will be cooperative as well, but not so if too many neighbours defect.16 Unconditionally
cooperative agents with a high level of friendliness are born very rarely, and only by chance. These
“idealistic” individuals will usually be exploited, have very poor payoffs, and no offspring. However,
if born into an environment where enough agents have a moderate friendliness and are conditionally
cooperative, “idealists” with a high level of friendliness and unconditionally cooperative behavior
can trigger cooperative behavior of the neighbors in a cascade-like manner. Under such conditions,
high levels of friendliness are passed on to many offspring such that a “homo socialis” with other-
regarding preferences emerges and spreads. This holds, because greater friendliness now tends to be
profitable. On average, cooperators earn higher payoffs than defectors. Hence, the “homo socialis”
can eventually outcompete the “homo economicus”, while initially the “homo economicus” earns
more (see Fig. 1). Nevertheless, the friendliness levels are widely distributed, thereby explaining
heterogeneous individual preferences, as empirically observed (Murphy et al., 2011). In other words,
everything from selfish to altruistic preferences exists.
In the situation studied above, where everyone starts as a defecting “homo economicus”, no single
individual can establish profitable cooperation, not even by optimizing decisions over an infinitely
long time horizon. It takes a few “friendly” deviations to trigger cascade effects that eventually
change the macro-level outcome. Therefore, it is important to recognize that a critical number of
interacting individuals need to be friendly and cooperative by coincidence. The “homo socialis”
would never evolve without the occurrence of random “mistakes” (here: the birth of “idealists” who
are exploited by everyone). However, given suitable feedback effects, such “errors” enable better
outcomes. Here, they eventually overcome the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), resulting
in an “upward spiral” towards cooperation with high payoffs. Remarkably, this is not the outcome
of an optimization process, but rather of an evolutionary process.
The simple evolutionary theory described in the paper discussed above contained very few
fundamental and widely accepted assumptions, and might have the potential to form the basis of
an integrated theoretical approach in the behavioral sciences. In accordance with a lot of work in
social psychology, the “homo socialis” may be characterized by “empathy” in the sense that the
“homo socialis” puts himself or herself into the shoes of others. More precisely, the “homo socialis”
takes into account the perspective, interests, and success of others when taking own decisions.17
This effectively explains the fairness preference observed in behavioral economics (Gu¨th et al., 1982;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Henrich et al., 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Note, however, that the
“homo socialis” should not be imagined as a “homo economicus” sharing some payoff with others.
The “homo socialis” decides differently from the “homo economicus”, and that is why “tragedies
of the commons” can be overcome.18
Decisions of the “homo socialis” are interdependent, in contrast to the “homo economicus”, who
takes decisions indendently without the consideration of effects on others. Therefore, the “homo
15The “homo socialis” may be defined as being sensitive to the social context, while the “homo economicus” is
not. However, the other-regarding preference must not be reflected by a utility function that weights the payoffs of
others, see Sec. 5.1.
16Conditional cooperators can exist for friendliness values ρi with (T −R)/(T −S) < ρi < (P −S)/(T −S) (Grund
et al., 2013), with the payoff values P,R, S, T defined in the caption of Fig. 2. Below the lower threshold, an agent
always defects and corresponds to a “homo economicus”. Above the higher threshold, an agent is unconditionally
cooperative (an “idealist”). As a consequence, if all agents would have an identical friendliness ρ, one would expect
a hysteretic system behavior as a function of the friendliness value. When the friendliness increases from low to high
values, a discontinuous transition from defection to cooperation of everyone is expected when the value (P−S)/(T−S)
is exceeded, while a discontinuous transition from a cooperative to a defective behavior of everyone is expected when
the friendliness value becomes smaller than (T −R)/(T − S).
17However, taking account the interests of others must not necessarily be based on a weighted utility function, see
the example on traffic light control in Sec. 5.1.
18One might say the “homo socialis” makes the individual and system optimum (more) compatible with each other.
7
FED
CBA
Figure 2: Evolution of a “cooperation between strangers” (here: cooperation between
two different families).
The above figure shows snapshots (at times t = 0, 250, 500, 1000, 2000, and t = 2500 = 125 gen-
erations) of a representative simulation run for two families (i.e. two kinds of genetically related
individuals), populating 60% of a 50 × 50 spatial grid without periodic boundary conditions. For
a related video see http://vimeo.com/65376719. The initial friendliness in the orange-turquoise
family is 0, and in the red-blue family it is assumed to be 0.2 (but it could be chosen 0 as well,
see Grund et al. (2013)). One finds the emergence of cooperation in both families (represented by
blue or turquoise), which cannot occur for the “homo economicus”. Hence, cooperation implies a
“homo socialis”. Remarkably, there are clusters in which members of different families cooperate
(i.e. a “cooperation between strangers” evolves). Individuals play 2-person prisoner’s dilemma
games with all neighbors in their respective Moore neighborhoods (but similar results are expected
for some other social dilemma games as well). The payoff parameters are the “Reward” R = 1 for
the cooperation of both interaction partners, the “Punishment” P = 0 for non-cooperative behavior
on both sides, the “Temptation” T = 1.1 for a defector exploiting a cooperator, and the “Sucker’s
Payoff” S = −1 for an exploited cooperator. Each agent’s utility function weights the payoffs of
the neighbors with the “friendliness” ρi, i.e. the utility function Ui of an agent i is assumed to
be Ui = (1 − ρi)Pi + ρi〈P 〉i, where Pi is the payoff of individual i and 〈P 〉i the average payoff of
the neighbors. For all agents, the initial friendliness is set to ρi = 0 (corresponding to a “homo
economicus”) and the initial behavior (“strategy”) is assumed to be defective (orange or red). The
behaviors of all individuals are simultaneously updated based on a best response rule, which implies
a behavior that maximizes the individual utility based on the behaviors of the neighbors. Only with
a probability of 0.05 do individuals take other decisions than the best response rule suggests.
To allow for evolution, while keeping population size constant, individuals die at random with the
probability β = 0.05, but are replaced with offspring of living individuals. The likelihood to give
birth to offspring is proportional to the actual payoffs in the previous round (i.e. not proportional to
the utility). With probability ν, the offspring is born in the closest empty site to the parent, while
with probability (1 − ν), the offspring moves to a randomly selected empty site (here: ν = 0.95).
Offsprings inherit a trait called friendliness ρi from their parents, which is subject to random
mutations. (With probability 0.8 the offspring’s friendliness is “reset” to a uniformly distributed
random value between 0 and the friendliness ρi of the parent, and with probability 0.2 it takes on a
uniformly distributed value between ρi and 1.) The local reproduction rate ν determines, whether
a transition from a “homo economicus” with self-regarding preferences to a “homo socialis” with
other-regarding preferences takes place, see Fig. 2 in Grund et al. (2013).
socialis” may be characterized by the term “networked minds”. This implies a complex dynamics of
systems where many such decision-makers interact, with important economic implications (Helbing
and Kirman, 2013). While methods from statistics should be good enough to characterize the
“homo economicus”, the description of the “homo socialis” requires methods drawn from complexity
science.
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3.2 The FuturICT Initiative
When non-linear interactions and network interdependencies prevail, economic systems are expected
to be complex dynamical systems (Krugman, 1996; Day, 1999; Auyang, 1999; Faggini and Lux,
2009; Kirman, 2010a; Brock and Hommes, 1997; Lux and Marchesi, 1999; Helbing and Balietti,
2010; Keen, 2013; Arthur, 2013). From ecology, climate research, and statistical physics it is known
that such systems can not be well understood merely by analytical and econometric approaches,
because of emergent system properties resulting from interactions between the system components
Strogatz (1994).
A characteristic feature of complex dynamical systems is that they may not necessarily be in
equilibrium (Delli Gatti et al., 2008; Helbing et al., 2004), and that a representative agent approach
may not work as well (Gallegati and Kirman, 1999; Deguchi, 2004; Helbing, 2012), partly because
of strong correlations and cascade effects (Battiston et al., 2012; Tedeschi et al., 2012; Helbing,
2013a). Therefore, the FuturICT initiative (see http://www.futurict.eu) has recently proposed
to combine socio-economic approaches with complexity science, massive computer power and Big
Data to analyze, model and simulate techno-socio-economic-environmental systems. The initiative
aims to develop a better understanding of the highly interdependent and densely networked world
we are living in, to increase its sustainability and resilience.
The FuturICT initiative points out that the globalization and the increasing connectedness in
human-influenced (“anthropogenic”) systems has increased the complexity of our world and also
created systemic risks (Helbing, 2013a). It is argued that, due to emergent phenomena, densely
connected and strongly interacting systems cannot be understood from the properties of the com-
ponents and the behaviors of separately deciding agents (Helbing and Carbone, eds, 2012). This
implies the need to fundamentally change our conceptional approach, namely to move from a
component-oriented perspective to an interaction-oriented, systemic perspective. Consequently,
policy implications may look quite different from what the theory of independent decision-makers
suggests, but this may help to overcome some long-standing problems (Salzano and Colander, eds,
2007; Helbing and Kirman, 2013; Helbing, 2012).
In order to ensure that our knowledge can keep up with the speed of change of our complex,
globalized world, the FuturICT initiative also proposes to establish a “Global Systems Science”
aiming at a “grand integration of knowledge” by combining the best knowledge of the social, natural
and engineering sciences in a large-scale and truly interdisciplinary effort (Helbing, 2013a). Despite
competition, I believe that scientific curiosity can promote a respectful interaction and cooperation
that can generate insights on all sides. For this, one should promote a culture of cross-disciplinary
appreciation.
4 Differences between the “Homo Socialis” and the “Homo
Economicus”
One may argue that the “homo socialis”, who considers the payoff of others, has been covered by
rational choice theory already (Bergstrom, 1999; Bramoulle´, 2001), since it has been increasingly
recognized that (many) people do not just optimize the own payoffs (as shown, for example, by
Ultimatum Game experiments, see Gu¨th et al. (1982); Henrich et al. (2001)). To take this into
account, it has been assumed that individual preferences are part of the utility function and that
altruistically behaving individuals enjoy helping others, while the others do not. However, when the
utility function is treated as individual rather than universal quantity, a rational choice theory based
on utility maximization loses much of its predictability and strength. Then, the utility function
cannot be calculated from first principles, but it must be statistically fitted from data separately
for each individual. In contrast, the above theory of the “homo socialis” provides an evolutionary
explanation of the individual utility function, which is a major advantage.
In fact, both, the “homo economicus” and the “homo socialis” assume self-determined individual
decisions, just according to different utility functions. At first glance, it may appear that this
difference is not important. However, when the “friendliness” parameter in the utility function is
changed continuously, one eventually crosses a “tipping point” beyond which the resulting individual
and system behavior look dramatically different. In other words, when the friendliness parameter
is varied, the system behavior changes discontinuously. Individual optimization attempts will only
simultaneously create individual prosperity and maximum social benefits beyond a certain level of
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“friendliness”, i.e. for the “homo socialis”.
In other words, in social dilemma situations, Adam Smith’s principle of the “invisible hand”
works only for the “homo socialis”, but not for the “homo economicus”. Without suitable insti-
tutional settings or regulations, the “homo economicus” will run into a “tragedy of the commons”
with very poor payoffs for the great majority. Note that the principle of the “invisible hand” would
work for the “homo economicus” as well, if the underlying assumptions of the First Theorem of
Welfare Economics were fulfilled, i.e. if all individuals would interact in one shared market with-
out transaction costs and externalities (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1959). However, these
assumptions are quite restrictive, and the macro-level outcome depends on them in a sensitive
manner. For example, non-centralized network interactions and transaction costs can manifestly
change the outcome (Coase, 1960; Roca et al., 2012).
As the “homo economicus” decides strictly according to self-interest, the coordination of decision-
makers and efforts to overcome “tragedies of the commons” or market failures requires some kind of
top-down regulation. This results in a steadily growing number of laws and regulations and costly
investments into regulatory and sanctioning institutions (such as police, courts, market regulators,
etc.). This can significantly decrease systemic efficiency. In addition, regulation tends to reduce
diversity, which can affect innovation in a negative way (Page, 2008; Cooke, 2009; Saviotti and
Frenken, 2008; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Helbing et al., 2005).
In comparison with the “homo economicus”, the “homo socialis” is able to cope with social
dilemma situations based on local interactions. I will characterize this as bottom-up self-regulation,
considering that the emergent level of “friendliness” overcoming the “tragedy of the commons”
results from a decentralized, evolutionary process. Since top-down regulation (as required for the
“homo economicus”) is just the opposite of bottom-up self-regulation (as typical for the “homo
socialis”), it is misleading to say that the “homo socialis” is just a variant of the “homo economicus”
or vice versa. Speaking metaphorically, the “homo economicus” and the “homo socialis” must be
distinguished like night and day. This is mainly due to the discontinuous transition in the systemic
outcome when the “friendliness” increases beyond a certain critical level (“tipping point”) (see
footnote 16). Passing the tipping point is like switching the light on or off, with dramatic impacts
on the average payoff (see Fig. 1).
5 Socionomics: A Promising New Field of Research
The existence of two different kinds of people, the “homo economicus” and the “homo socialis”, has
relevant practical implications: A second body of work must be developed for the “homo socialis”
to supplement the extant economic body of work for the “homo economicus”. I will call the science
of the “homo economicus” - “economics”, and the science of the “homo socialis” “socionomics” or
also “economics 2.0” in order to reflect that the Web 2.0 is a key factor promoting a “participatory
market society” (Oreilly, 2007). It is important to note that our understanding of socionomics does
not assume emotionally or irrationally acting agents. In the simulations underlying Figs. 1 and 2,
the “homo socialis” decides rationally, trying to optimize the individual utility, but this utility also
reflects the externalities of others. In social dilemma situations, the “homo socialis” can outperform
the “homo economicus” through reaching higher payoffs.
Socionomics, and What Distinguishes it from Economics
In contrast to prevailing work in sociology, socionomics includes the study of suitable institutions
and operational principles for future market and exchange systems.19 Market and exchange sys-
tems fitting the “homo economicus” and the “homo socialis” will be different. In the same way
as economic market systems are called “economies”, I will call market systems based on socio-
nomic principles “socionomies” or “economies 2.0”. I will also use the term ”participatory market
societies”, as socionomies bring economic activities together with a social orientation. The partici-
patory character of socionomies will become clearer when I discuss the role of “prosumers”, i.e. of
co-producing consumers in Sec. 7.1.
But what might be distinguishing features of socionomies as compared to economies?
19I would like to point out that socionomics has certain points in common with other emerging research directions
such as evolutionary economics, network economics, complexity economics, behavioral economics, or socio-economics,
to mention just a few.
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Economics 2.0
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in Economic
Thinking
Figure 3: Illustration of the two distinct economic paradigms. The difference between
the “homo economicus” and the “homo socialis” is that the latter takes into account the interests
of others when making decisions, which implies interdependent decisions or “networked minds”.
The different nature of the “homo socialis” leads to a complex dynamics and another macroscopic
outcome than expected for the “homo economicus”.
In the case of public goods problems, for example, interactions of agents with strictly self-regarding
preferences will lead to “tragedies of the commons”, while the self-regulation of the “homo socialis”
can overcome this undesirable state and foster cooperation, leading to higher individual and social
benefits.
Due to the different system dynamics and different systemic outcomes, both types of agents cannot
be described by the same body of theory. They require separate sets of literature and different
institutions.
Central
Planner
Centrally Planned
Economy
top down
top down
Homo
Economicus
Conventional
Market Economy
bottom up
top down
Participatory
Market Society
Homo
Socialis
bottom up
bottom up
Organization
Regulation
Market
System
Figure 4: Comparison of different ways of organizing and regulating markets, based on
a (benevolent) “central planner”, the “homo economicus” or the “homo socialis”. The
organization and regulation of the “homo socialis” needs to be distinguished from both, centrally
planned an conventional market economies. Hence, I propose to devote a new branch of economics
called “socionomics” or “economics 2.0” to the study of the system dynamics, outcomes, and
suitable institutions of the “homo socialis”. The related socio-economic systems are “participatory
market societies”. These systems are now emerging and spreading due to the Web2.0, particularly
thanks to social media platforms.
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• In socionomies, self-regarding optimization is replaced by individual decisions that take into
account the implications for others (“externalities”), thereby supporting mutual coordination
and cooperation.
• Therefore, in socionomies, agents would have cooperative motives in addition to competitive
ones. This is sometimes characterized by the term “coopetition”20.
• In socionomies, regulation can happen in a bottom-up way, which is called “self-regulation”.
• In socionomies, social dilemma situations can also be overcome without financial incentives
and fines, for example, by reputation systems (see Sec. 6.2).
• In socionomies, sharing information and other resources pays off, as this supports coordination
and cooperation.
As socionomics is emergent, the above points need to be investigated with simulation models
and experiments to identify the power and limitations of the new paradigm of the “homo socialis”
and the institutions needed (see Sec. 6).
5.1 What One Can Learn from Traffic Light Control
Like the preferences of economic agents, urban traffic flows are characterized by externalities (as
they negatively interfere with each other). Therefore, when discussing different ways of organizing
and regulating markets, one can learn much from urban traffic light control. For this purpose,
let us treat road intersections as agents that are networked with each other. Then, if we let
all intersections optimize the local traffic flows independently of each other, this corresponds to
the approach of a “homo economicus”. If the intersections take into account the traffic flows at
neighboring intersections in their control decisions, this corresponds to the “homo socialis”. I will
also compare this with the approach of a central regulator, who tries to optimize traffic flows in the
entire city in a top-down way.
The typical goal of traffic control is to minimize congestion, environmental impact, and travel
times. Today, decisions are usually taken top down by a traffic control center, corresponding to a
central regulator. However, typically, the mobility demand changes more quickly than the control
strategy can be adjusted, with the consequence that the optimization of traffic flows often leads to
suboptimal results.
In the following paragraphs, I will explain how and why a self-regulation approach based on a
flexible, adaptive response to local traffic flows can be more successful than the top-down control by
a central regulatory authority. To control traffic lights, many cities today use supercomputers trying
to identify the optimal solution for the system and to implement it like a “benevolent dictator”.
A typical solution creates “green waves” by synchronizing neighboring traffic lights. However, in
large cities, even supercomputers are unable to manage strict traffic light optimization in real-
time due to the algorithmic complexity of the optimization problem (“NP completeness”). The
number of parameters and the possible combinations of their values are so large that the required
computational time “explodes” with the number of traffic lights.
Instead, traffic light control schemes are usually optimized offline for representative (average)
traffic flows at a certain weekday and time, or for certain events (e.g. football games)21. The
corresponding control schemes are then activated in the situations for which they were optimized.
In addition, these may be adapted to the actual traffic situation by extending or shortening green
phases. However, at a particular intersection the periodicity (i.e. the order of green phases serving
the incoming roads) is usually kept the same during the operation of a control scheme. While the
adaptation of traffic phases improves the traffic light control, it must be recognized that the concept
of “representative” traffic flows is very misleading: the variability of the number of vehicles waiting
at a traffic light is about as large as the average value. This implies a sub-optimal performance of
the central regulator approach.
Let us now compare the central traffic light control with the “homo economicus” strategy,
where each intersection strictly optimizes local traffic flows independently by minimizing average
waiting times (La¨mmer and Helbing, 2008). We assume that each intersection measures not only
20see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coopetition
21This is also the approach that the mean value approximation behind the representative agent approach would
suggest.
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Figure 5: Table highlighting the differences between the nature of a central planner, the
“homo economicus”, and the “homo socialis”, including their different system dynam-
ics and systemic outcomes. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics(Arrow and Debreu, 1954;
Debreu, 1959), which states that competitive markets lead to an efficient allocation of resources,
only holds if there is a complete set of markets and all market participants are price-takers, and
there are neither externalities nor transaction costs.
As conventional market economies tend to create negative externalities, top-down regulation by a
strong state is needed to counter related market failures. Examples of negative externalities are
resource depletion and environmental pollution, which eventually lead to the creation of regulatory
institutions such as the emission trading scheme or financial regulatory authorities. As regulation
tends to be costly for regulators and regulated agents, bottom-up self-regulation is expected to
unleash large creative potentials of “networked minds”, which are currently not fully used (see Sec.
7). The performance gains may well be comparable to the gains when moving from a top-down
regulation to a conventional market economy building on self-organization (see Sec. 5.1).
“Socionomies” (also called “economies 2.0” or “participatory market societies”), are characterized
by high levels of cooperation, established through self-regulation. To protect a “homo socialis” from
being exploited, it is important to know whether one is interacting with another “homo socialis” or
a “homo economicus”. Therefore, suitable institutions such as reputation mechanisms need to be
established, which allow like-minded agents to interact successfully, and differently minded agents
to cope with each other. Examples for socionomic systems are Wikipedia, Open Streetmap, open
source software communities (such as Linux or GitHub), and social media platforms.
Note that the “homo socialis” should not be confused with someone, who is redistributing gains. A
redistribution strategy (via donations, or taxes and social benefit systems) might be able to “heal”
or reduce problems such as an “unhealthy” degree of inequality, but it would usually not be able
to avoid or overcome “tragedies of the commons”. Hence, redistribution is inefficient and often not
a suitable solution for social dilemma situations (see also footnote 27). The main difference to the
“homo economicus” is that the “homo socialis” decides more “responsibly” or “wisely”, considering
not only the own interests, but also those of others when taking self-determined decisions. If enough
people do this, other-regarding preferences pays off.
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Figure 6: Schematic illustration of three kinds of traffic light control: a “central regulator”,
a strategy minimizing local waiting times (“homo economicus” approach) and a strategy considering
externalities on neighboring intersections (“homo socials” approach).
the outflows of the incoming road sections, but also receives information about the inflows into
these road sections that originate at the neighboring intersections. This information exchange
between neighboring intersections allows short-term predictions of the arrival times of vehicles.
Hence, the “homo economicus” strategy can respond to this prediction in a way that tries to keep
vehicles moving, thereby minimising waiting times. This self-organizes the local traffic flows, but
the principle of the “invisible hand” works only up to a certain traffic volume (La¨mmer and Helbing,
2008). Long before the intersection capacity is reached, the average queue length tends to get out
of control, as some road sections with small traffic flows are not served frequently enough (see
Fig. 7).22 This will create spillover effects and obstructions of upstream traffic flows, such that
congestion quickly spreads over large parts of the city in a cascade-like manner. The resulting state
may be compared with a “tragedy of the commons”, as the available intersection capacities is not
efficiently used.
In order to outperform the central regulator over the whole range of traffic demands (utilizations)
an intersection can handle, one must extend the “homo economicus”-based self-control approach to
a self-regulatory approach. Specifically, the rule of waiting time minimization must be combined
with a second rule, according to which a vehicle queue must be cleared immediately, whenever it
reaches a critical length (a certain percentage of the road section). This second rule avoids spill-over
effects that would obstruct neighboring intersections and therefore acts in an other-regarding way,
as a “homo socialis” would do. The self-regulation strategy uses occurring gaps as opportunities
to serve other traffic flows. So, rather than planning green waves by synchronizing traffic lights in
a certain rhythm, self-regulated traffic lights take into account the traffic situation at neighboring
intersections, just as a “homo socialis” would do. This enables the coordination of neighboring
traffic lights which can spread over many intersections.
In summary, the self-regulation approach coordinates traffic lights and traffic flows based on
local interactions. While the self-regulation is based on a decentralized bottom-up approach rather
than a centralized top-down approach, it surprisingly reaches a superior performance (La¨mmer and
Helbing, 2010). Studies comparing self-regulated traffic lights with state-of-the-art traffic control
approaches show that smaller waiting times can be simultaneously reached for individual traffic,
public transport, pedestrians, and bikes (La¨mmer and Helbing, 2010). Self-controlled traffic also
reduces environmental pollution without having to impose travel restrictions, and it also makes
travel times more predictable.
From the above example, we can draw a number of important conclusions:
1. In complex systems with strongly variable and largely unpredictable dynamics, bottom-up
self-regulation can outperform top-down optimization by a central regulator (an urban traffic
control center). This also holds when input data are comprehensive and reliable.
22In other words: minimum waiting times are generally not compatible with minimum queue lengths and vice
versa.
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Figure 7: Comparison of the performance of a central regulator, local optimization of
traffic flows as a “homo economicus” would do, and other-regarding self-regulation,
considering the impact on neighboring intersections.
The graphics shows average queue lengths resulting for these different traffic control approaches
(after La¨mmer and Helbing (2010)). Always clearing the longest queues performs worse than a
periodic service that is optimized in a top-down way, as a central regulator would do. A local
minimization of waiting times, corresponding to a situation where each intersection acts like a
“homo economicus”, outperforms a periodic service at low utilizations of the theoretical intersection
capacity, but it creates long queues and spill-over effects at high utilizations. A decentralized self-
regulation with other-regarding decision rules, corresponding to the approach of a “homo socialis”,
performs best. It also minimizes waiting times locally, but this principle is over-ruled by the
clearing of critical queues, which might block neighboring intersections by spill-over effects. The
self-regulation approach also outperforms an optimized cyclical service, where the green times are
adapted to the respective traffic situation (La¨mmer and Helbing, 2010).
2. Strict local optimization according to the principles of a “homo economicus” may create a
highly peforming system within a certain parameter range, but tends to fail when interaction
effects by traffic flows of neighboring intersections are strong and the optimization at each
intersection is performed separately, in a self-regarding way.
3. When taking into account the situation of interaction partners (“neighbors”), as an other-
regarding “homo socialis” would do, a high system performance can be reached even for strong
interaction effects because of coordination between neighbors.
In conclusion, a central regulator fails to be efficient for lack of computational capacity, which
is required to handle the algorithmic complexity of a NP-hard optimization problem within large
system in real-time. Applying the principle of the “homo economicus” on a local level, fails due
to lack of coordination. In contrast, the approach of the other-regarding “homo socialis” can over-
come both problems by combining self-organization with self-regulation. A self-regulation based
on suitable local interactions can produce resource-efficient solutions delivering high system perfor-
mance.23 These solutions also tend to be resilient to perturbations (such as accidents, road works,
etc.). Again, the “homo socialis” can make the principle of the “invisible hand” work under con-
ditions, where it fails for the independent optimization attempts of a “homo economicus” (see Fig.
7).
Many of the above conclusions also seem to be relevant for socio-economic systems, when agents
have incompatible interests that cannot be satisfied at the same time.
23The recent trend towards replacing many signalized intersections by roundabouts and changing urban spaces
regulated by many traffic signs in favor of designs supporting a considerate interaction and self-organization of
different traffic participants suggests an on-going paradigm shift from regulation to self-regulation Hamilton-Baillie
(2008).
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6 Institutions for the “Homo Socialis”
6.1 Mechanisms to Overcome Social Dilemma Situations
Institutions for market systems should not just work under ideal (“good weather”) conditions, but
also under difficult ones. They should be suited not only for best-case scenarios, but also for worst-
case scenarios, in as much as this is possible. Therefore, in the spirit of the self-regulation approach,
we are looking for:
1. rules to handle externalities of decisions, protecting others from exploitation and compensating
them for damage,
2. frameworks to coordinate between individuals and projects with different preferences and
interests.
In particular, we are searching for institutions that work in the case of social dilemma situations.
From game theory, it is known that cooperation is endangered by interaction with defectors (Fehr
and Gachter, 2002).
As the “homo economicus” is always expected to defect when deciding according to a best
response rule (maximizing the payoff given the current behaviors of the neighbors), cooperation by
the “homo socialis” must be somehow protected from exploitation by the “homo economicus”. In
other words, the “homo socialis” is not expected to thrive in institutional settings designed for the
“homo economicus” such as homogeneous global markets, which destabilize cooperation in social
dilemma situations (Helbing et al., 2011; Helbing, 2013a). I would like to stress again that any
situation, in which a market participant can be cheated, establishes a social dilemma situation.
Nevertheless, there are solutions to the problem.
Evolutionary game theory has identified a number of biological and social mechanisms that can
create suitable institutional settings for cooperation in social dilemma situations. These includes
genetic favoritism and direct reciprocity (“I help you, if you help me”) (Nowak, 2006), but also
punitive institutions (such as the criminal justice system, and legal and regulatory authorities).
However, all these mechanisms have undesired side effects. Genetic favoritism impedes an open
global exchange and leads to ethnic conflict. Direct reciprocity is hardly compatible with global
openness to new trading partners, and could also incentivise corruption. Punishment institutions
are costly and create inefficiencies, as discussed in Sec. 4. In Sec. 3, cooperation spreads due to a
naturally resulting spatial segregation between cooperators and defectors, when intergenerational
migration is low (Grund et al., 2013). Another mechanism is based on reputation systems (Conte
and Paolucci, 2002; Milinski et al., 2002), which transfers the functional principle of social commu-
nities to a globalized world. Such reputation systems work also in a decentralized way (Kamvar et
al., 2003; Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004; Xiong and Liu, 2004; Zhou and Hwang, 2007; Mundinger
and Le Boudec, 2008).
6.2 User-Centric, Multi-Criteria Reputation Systems and Incentives
The purpose of the reputation system is to avoid costly transaction failures arising from mismatched
expectations regarding the kind of economic exchange (Winter et al., 2012). In other words, rep-
utation systems can help different types of agents such as the “homo socialis” and the “homo
economicus” to cope with each other. Reputation systems are currently spreading on the Web. A
typical example is ebay. Reputation and recommender systems are now used to evaluate goods,
service providers and news. It has been shown that ebay sellers with a higher reputation can sell
products at a higher price, i.e. a good reputation pays off (Przepiorka, 2013). This incentivises
reputation-enhancing behaviour. In addition to price-based competition, recommender and reputa-
tion systems also endorse quality-based competition, i.e. features such as responsible environmental
and social production conditions become more relevant and rewarding.
An important question to ask is: who would decide the reputation of someone or something?
To successfully cope with a system of high complexity (see Sec. 5.1), it seems necessary to build
on a bottom-up self-regulation approach. Therefore, the reputation should be decided decentrally,
by each decision-maker, based on his or her own preferences and values. In other words, it should
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not be a company or another institution that determines the reputation, but the individuals.24 We
should also consider that criteria determining high quality for some, may represent poor quality
for others. Thus ideally, recommender systems should be multi-dimensional, based on a variety
of criteria. Decision-makers can then define filters determining reputation based on their own
criteria.25 Moreover, people could share their own reputation filters with others, who may modify
them according to their own perspective. Therefore, opening up recommender data to everyone
would enable the evolution of an “information ecosystem”, in which customized information filters
would steadily improve over time. A similar reputation principle could also be applied to money.
6.3 Qualified Money
One interesting – and somewhat speculative – question is what would happen, if we applied the
principles of reputation systems to money itself (Moreton and Twigg, 2003), i.e. if each unit of
money could earn a reputation, depending on its origin and transaction history.26 Then, units of
money could be treated as separate stocks. Thus money would be related not just with a quantity,
but also with some qualities. This would make money multi-dimensional, akin to feedback and
exchange systems in biological and ecological systems, or also social systems (Fiske, 1993). I call
this concept “qualified money”.
Note that the one-dimensionality of today’s money has a number of problematic features. It
basically implies that there can only be ups and downs. The bubbles and crashes that financial sys-
tems experience over the last hundreds of years (Graeber, 2011; Davies, 2002) may be a consequence
of this. For a complex dynamical system such as the financial system to work well, it is important
that there are enough parameters to allow the system to adapt.27 Currently, the financial system
suffers from a lack of such parameters.
If we had “qualified money”, a conversion factor would apply, which would determine the value
of money together with its quantity. The conversion factor would depend on the qualities of the
respective money units, which would be given by multiple reputation values. Hence, the conversion
factors establish adaptive parameters. Therefore, Euros in a certain country could gain a higher or
lower reputation (and value) than in other countries. If a country would suffer from an economic
depression, the conversion factor would decrease, and the corresponding devaluation of money would
help the country to solve its problems by inflation. In other words, the international financial system
would have enough degrees of freedom for self-regulation to work.
As indicated before, the qualifiers could also be made dependent on the transaction history.
If money were history-dependent, then money generated in certain ways (e.g. by environmental-
friendly production) would gain additional value, if a customer cares about it. This would create
incentives to invest into quality, not just quantity. Therefore, the downward spiral leading to
“tragedies of the commons” could be overcome. There would be a competition for money of higher
quality. Note that the properties entering the qualifiers (and those that are not made transparent
or evaluated) would be decided in a bottom-up way, first of all by the confidentiality settings of
the owner and second by letting potential customers choose their own quality filters, as described
for the multi-dimensional reputation system before. This would establish an implicit negotiation
process between sellers and buyers, i.e. it would give customers more influence on price formation
than just by a decision to buy a product or abstain from it. In this way, customers would become a
“voice” allowing them to inform producers about the qualities they value and the factors they care
less about. If this would influence the corresponding conversion factors strongly enough, it would
24The problems of recommender systems, which cannot be configured by the users themselves, have been discussed
in the book “Filter Bubble” (Pariser, 2012). One of them is the manipulation of decision-makers, because the
“wisdom of crowds” can be seriously undermined by feeding back opinions of others (Lorenz et al., 2011). This can
reduce socio-diversity as well (Helbing, 2013b) and, thereby, affect the functionality of fundamental institutions that
societies are built on. Democratic and market institutions require independent decision-making to function well.
25As a consequence, someone may have a good reputation in some areas and no or bad reputation in others,
depending on the values and viewpoints of the potential interaction partners. Therefore, a user-centric, multi-criteria
reputation system can help one to find like-minded people. Note that reputation data do not have to be public, but
may also be provided on request.
26I would like to underline that this section has currently a preliminary and speculative character, as it first needs to
be grounded on computational and empirical evidence before it can be practically applied. However, the exploration
of complementary, alternative, and backup financial systems seems to be in place.
27Note that trying to reach many different, non-aligned goals with just one control variable is an “ill-defined”
(unfeasible) control problem. Assume that one tries to encourage k desirable behaviors and discourage l undesirable
ones with corresponding positive and negative tax incentives, then the overall effect will be rather unspecific and
most of the goals are unlikely to be reached.
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be an effective way of improving quality standards. In a such a way, “qualified money” could also
help to increase sustainability.
6.4 Platforms for Participation, Exchange and Mutual Compensation
Another important institution for the “homo socialis” are participatory platforms that support a
trusted and fair exchange (de Montjoye et al., 2012), as required to coordinate with each other and to
consider the interests and preferences of others. Such platforms should provide tools for cooperation,
allowing people to set up joint projects, communicate and collaborate. Ideally, the platform would
support everything from the scheduling of processes to supply chain management and accounting.
The functionality should be easy to use at an affordable price with open and interoperable interfaces,
while providing secure information storage and exchange for sensitive data. New information and
communication technology (ICT) and the data they produce and manage will also make it possible
to determine and quantify harmful interactions, and to reduce them by compensation mechanisms
(such as appropriate payments). This possibility arises, in particular, as the “Internet of Things”
spreads.
The FuturICT initiative has recently proposed to build a “Global Participatory Platform”,
which would eventually allow everyone to set up collaboration projects with others, underpinned
by Open Data (Buckingham Shum et al., 2012). Such a platform could also be used for eGovernance
applications such as the payment of taxes, health and other insurances. From the perspective of self-
regulation, it seems to make sense that the people involved in participatory decision-making would
be those who are significantly affected by the respective externalities and those who care about the
subject. In the future, this principle might be applied to economic and political decision-making
alike.
6.5 Innovation Accelerator
To promote innovation, it is important to have incentives to invest efforts into innovation. Today,
this is done by protecting intellectual property by patents. It often appears, however, that patents
can also obstruct innovation. It would therefore be desirable to find a mechanism to reward inno-
vations automatically, whenever someone’s idea is used.28 If we had a way to measure the value of
micro-innovations, we could innovate in a much more collaborative and open way. Whoever would
have a good idea could contribute to a difficult invention and get a reward for it. Building on
crowd sourcing and swarm intelligence in such a way could largely speed up innovation, and also
lead to higher-quality results (van Harmelen et al., 2012). Rewards could either be micropayments
per use (as spotify does it, for example) or non-monentary incentives (such as citations in science
or reputation points), or both.
6.6 “Socionomics”, or “Economics 2.0”
Last but not least, one important institution to promote the “homo socialis” would be a scientific
discipline to study the implications of this concept and suitable institutional settings (Schotter,
1981; Schubert and von Wangenheim, 2006). As pointed out before, this calls for a field such as
“socionomics” or “economics 2.0” (Ha¨ring and Storbeck, 2012). Note that one particular challenge
will be to study the principles of successful self-regulation within complex systems. This will have
to go beyond mechanism design (Hurwicz and Reiter, 2006), taking into account evolutionary prin-
ciples (Goldberg and Sastry, 2010) and thereby endogenizing innovation into the system dynamics.
Inspiration could also be drawn from ecological (Haldane and May, 2011), immune (Floreano and
Mattiussi, 2008), or social systems (Helbing, 2012).
Evolutionary principles would be able to identify improved rules for self-regulation in a truly
bottom-up way. The case of traffic light control (see Sec. 5.1) has shown that small changes of rules
may fundamentally change the systemic outcome and performance (such as large-scale congestion
as compared to free traffic flows). When a system is sensitive to details, self-regulation must include
rules that stabilize the application of successful rules (e.g. avoid a self-regarding modification of
rules). However, over-rigidity would affect innovation and, therefore, the ability to find even better
sets of rules. Evolutionary systems are therefore characterized by checking out diverse variants
28In this connection, Altmetrics (http://www.altmetric.com/) measuring page views and other web indicators
might play an important role in the future.
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(thanks to innovation-generating “mutations”) in combination with autocatalytic or reproduction
mechanisms ensuring that better variants spread more quickly. As a consequence, a decentralized
approach is an important precondition for success, while the implementation of homogeneous rules
in large areas is expected to reduce diversity and innovation.
7 Economies 2.0 as Participatory Market Societies
In the previous sections, I have discussed some theoretical arguments supporting a new organization
of market exchange. In this section, we will see that markets have already started to re-organize in
the suggested direction. For example, reputation and recommender systems are now found all over
the Web 2.0. Likewise, Social Media are providing participatory platforms, which are increasingly
used to set up collaborative projects. The example of facebook demonstrates that even with free
platforms one can generate considerable economic value. The next paragraphs give a better idea,
how future information and communication technologies are expected to change the lives of workers,
consumers and entrepreneurs.
7.1 Prosumers and the Future Role of Entrepreneurs
Today, we are still living in a world of slowly adapting institutions, which (in the best case) are
trying to take optimal decisions for many people, based on representative data, for example political
parties or companies. Although they have bottom-up elements, a great deal of decision-making is
done in a top-down manner. However, as systems become more complex, they will require more
bottom-up elements or they will otherwise perform poorly (see Sec. 5.1) or even destabilize over
time (Helbing, 2013a).
Digital technologies are now enabling more flexible ways of organization. In particular, people
may use social media platforms to organize “projects” in a bottom-up way. In principle everyone
could do this, given the required technical and social skill sets. This development could eventually
turn consumers into “prosumers”,29 i.e. consumers who are co-creating products they buy (and
sell) (Quain, 2008)). 3D printer technology, for example, will enable local production by small
teams or individuals who may sell their products to friends, colleagues or the rest of the world.
Rather than just specifying the color and individual features of a car when ordering, we may soon
design some of its components and commission their production. One may even set up a team of
designers, engineers, marketing people, and other specialists to design an own car with components
produced by other companies or with new components commissioned from home. That is, old-style
factories and socionomies based on collaborative projects are expected to work hand in hand.
To a certain extent, “projects” of the above kind are already in existence today, for example open
source software projects. Many such projects are driven by volunteers or employees of companies,
who rely on open source components and want to get their required features implemented. In any
case, the development is bottom-up and open. The “open source ecosystem” is based on a number
of ingredients such as “viral” open source licenses, which ensure that those using open source code
in their own software will also have to make it available to others. Therefore, software licenses
(such as the GNU General Public License) reward other-regarding behavior as it characterizes the
“homo socialis”. In the context of open source development, the GitHub platform30 has recently
become very popular among software developers. The platform indicates who has contributed how
much, thereby creating incentives for contributing. Thus, everyone can benefit from a growing set
of open source software.
The digital economy will open up infinite opportunities for new products. We might even say
that the information age enables infinite dimensions of creativity. This has very interesting implica-
tions for the resulting market structures. Today, we have a few core businesses and some peripheral
business activities. In the future, however, one may expect that projects and peripheral prod-
ucts will dominate market activities.31 This means that many more products will be individually
customized. Note also, that projects imply new forms of work and employment.32 But if suitable
29see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosumer
30https://github.com
31One may imagine this as the core of a sphere as compared to its surface area. Note, however, that the relationship
between the surface area A of an n-dimensional sphere and its volume V is V = rA/n, see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Sphere. That is, the higher the dimensionality of a market, the more happens in the peripheral (surface)
area.
32Amazon Mechanical Turk, for example, is a platform that matches tasks and workforce.
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institutions exist, projects could create a large number of jobs in the future. Therefore, socionomies
could not only unleash an age of creativity, but also provide novel ways to overcome the current
unemployment misery.
It is likely that, over time, companies, political parties, and other established institutions will
be complemented by “projects” as more flexible form of organization. Then, the future role of
entrepreneurs will be to set up and coordinate such projects, and organize the necessary supports.
Once completed, a project would terminate, and the previously involved people would look for
new projects to coordinate or participate in. In this way, a “participatory market society” would
emerge.33 Everyone could be both a coordinator and a participant of several projects, which
provides opportunities to influence issues one cares about. The fluent, project-based organization
of socio-economic activities might also be a good solution to the Peter Principle (Peter and Hull,
1969), according to which people get promoted until they end up in a position, which overstrains
their abilities.
“Projects” will also imply more self-determined and exciting work. To unleash creativity,
decision-making needs to take place differently from the way it works today. Currently, many
decisions are majority-based or top-down decisions. In the first instance, a majority decision is a
compromise, which is often disappointing to all (the “common denominator”). In the second case,
someone imposes decisions on others, which are potentially against their preferences. This creates
advantages for some and disadvantages for others. However, it should be remembered that diversity
is the main driving force of innovation in evolutionary systems (Page, 2008; Cooke, 2009; Saviotti
and Frenken, 2008; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Helbing et al., 2005). It would, therefore, be better to
allow projects to find their own rules.34 People could then easily find projects and socio-economic
environments that fit their individual preferences, interests, and needs.
8 Conclusions and Outlook
Globalization and technological revolutions have created new levels of interdependencies, intercon-
nectedness and complexities, which have the potential to destabilize our techno-socio-economic-
environmental system(s) on a global scale (Helbing, 2013a). It is therefore critical that, new ap-
proaches are found to stabilize global networks and counter systemic instability.
The current trend seems to point towards “surveillance societies” with strong punitive elements
(“punitive societies”). However, such a top-down approach would endanger privacy, socio-diversity
and innovation. It also implies major risks that personal data will be sooner or later misused and
that a transition to a totalitarian state can occur (Helbing, 2013b). Furthermore, recent findings
suggest that crime cannot be eliminated by large fines (Perc et al., 2013), contrary to what classical
rational choice models suggest, and there is little evidence that surveillance by CCTV cameras can
reduce crime in a systematic and statistically significant way (Gill and Spriggs, 2005).35 Trust,
when substantiated, seems to be a more sustainable basis of a stable society. In fact, another
recent trend points towards “reputation societies”, but the underlying reputation systems should
be user-centric, based on multiple criteria, and run in a decentralized way (Zhou and Hwang, 2007;
Mundinger and Le Boudec, 2008).
I expect that decentralized self-organization and self-regulation approaches can deliver solutions
for complex dynamical systems that are far superior to our existing way of designing and operating
systems. However, self-regulation does not mean that one can choose the rules as one likes. In
fact, as could be seen for the urban traffic light control example, self-regulation on the component
level generally does not work, but it must be other-regarding (which requires a certain amount of
trustable information exchange).36
33Note that “cooperatives”, which are a common form of business organization in Switzerland and elsewhere, fit a
participatory market society well, but “projects” are expected to be more short-lived and flexible.
34Future ICT systems will support and simplify coordination between people with different interests and back-
grounds. “Inter-cultural adapters” will help to overcome the need for everyone to agree on the same rules and
principles. Reputation systems will promote a proper quality (see Sec. 6.2).
35UK has surprisingly high crime rates in Europe, given the high coverage with CCTV cameras. A recent terror
attack in London intentionally committed below a CCTV camera also questions whether surveillance can be an
efficient strategy to stabilize society.
36Also note that the most efficient way of self-regulation may contain hierarchical elements, combining top-down
and bottom-up elements in a favorable way. So, at least in the next decades, I do not expect reputation systems to
replace top-down elements of social organization, but rather to complement them. Also, “qualified money” would
exist next to our current kind of money. However, I expect the relative proportion of self-regulation (bottom-up
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To be successful, societies must be able to resolve “social dilemma situations”, in particular, free-
riding must be efficiently contained. In social dilemma situations, cooperative behavior would be
favorable for everyone, but exploiting others creates even higher payoffs. Such situations often lead
to “tragedies of the commons”, where environmental pollution, overfishing, global warming, free-
riding, tax evasion, and the exploitation of our social benefit systems are typical results. Problems
like these are expected in particular for the “homo economicus”, who takes optimally self-regarding
decisions. In spite of this, the “homo economicus” is still a foundation of mainstream economic
thinking and many policies today.
As non-linear interaction and network effects become more and more important for today’s
decision-making (Schweitzer et al., 2009; Ormerod, 2012), a new approach is needed. The approach
of an other-regarding “homo socialis” now seems to be a more promising theoretical starting point
than the independently deciding “homo economicus”. Like the “homo economicus”, the “homo
socialis” results from the merciless forces of natural selection, but it can overcome “tragedies of the
commons” and, therefore, achieve higher payoffs.
To understand this, it is important to study economic systems from the viewpoint of complexity
theory. We have seen that
the combination of non-linear interactions with randomness (such as “mutations”) can produce
counter-intuitive emergent phenomena. Complexity theory could also provide a new perspective on
socio-economic systems more generally (Helbing and Kirman, 2013). The policy implications can
be quite different from those for the “homo economicus”. Therefore, one can expect novel insights
and fundamentally new solutions to old problems, including (over-)regulation, innovation, financial
crises, unemployment, and sustainability.
As Albert Einstein said: “We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of thinking that
created them”. In the past, there has been a steady struggle between economic activities and
social motives, and between bottom-up market organization and political top-down regulation.
Such regulation serves to avoid exploitation, “tragedies of the commons”, and market failures,
whenever the self-organization of the “homo economicus” does not lead to desirable outcomes. The
“homo socialis” bridges the gap between these apparently incompatible sides. However, as the
interdependent decisions of other-regarding, “networked minds” cause a complex system dynamics
and different outcomes on the macro-level, a new scientific discipline is needed, called “economics
2.0” or “socionomics”. This research field will have to study the implications of the “homo socialis”
and supportive institutional settings, particularly successful principles of self-regulation.
The new conceptual framework may be characterized as follows:
1. The “homo socialis” takes self-determined, but responsible decisions, caring about the impact
on others. While this fits well with Kant’s moral imperative37 and with the values promoted
by many religions, it does not need to be based on ethical or religious grounds (Nelson, 2001).
The concept is built on scientific insights showing that other-regarding behavior helps to
coordinate between incompatible interests, leading to better individual outcomes over a long
enough time horizon.
2. As the “homo socialis” is able to get more payoff under conditions that are highly competitive,
the concept of participatory market societies is not based on an idealistic approach. There is
also much empirical evidence in our digital economy for this.
3. The approach discussed in this paper promotes social order and social welfare, but also sus-
tainable prosperity, individual freedom, diversity and pluralism. It is very different from the
concept of a central regulator discussed in Sec. 5.1. In particular, it does not impose a
solution, which it considered best for everyone, on others, be it equality or something else.
4. The new approach rather builds on suitable principles of self-organization and self-regulation
based on decentralized decisions. This will allow one to cut down today’s overregulation,
thereby creating larger individual freedoms.
5. Efficient ICT-enabled reputation systems and “qualified money” might support such self-
regulation, if they are open, user-centric, participatory, and based on sufficiently many crite-
ria. They could create an institutional setting allowing the “homo socialis” and the “homo
organization) to grow substantially over time.
37see also the somewhat related work of Roemer (2010)
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economicus” to coexist.38 “Qualified money” would generalize established principles of value
exchange at stock markets to units of money. In particular, it would consider that informa-
tion is a precondition for markets to function, while today’s money is memory-less, thereby
cutting away important information that may allow financial systems to be more adaptive
and resilient. I expect the best solution to be a market system in which conventional and
qualified money would exist in parallel with suitable conversion rules.39
The Web 2.0 is a major driver of the transition from the conventional market economy (“economy
1.0”) to a “participatory market society” (“economy 2.0”). The change is largely fueled by social
media platforms, 3D printers enabling local production, and “Big Data” celebrated as the “Oil of
the 21st Century”. It is also driven by an increasing level of complexity, which can only be mastered
by a higher level of decentralization, as implied by the concept of self-regulation40.
This trend towards more decentralization is already visible in the way the Internet is organized,
the way smart grids are now being run, and the way modern traffic systems will be managed. For
socio-economic systems, the trend towards decentralization implies the participation of more people
in social, economic and political affairs. A historical perspective also suggests that more and more
people gain influence on decision-making processes as centuries progress.41
In fact, the digital revolution is already reshaping our economy (Pyka and Hanusch, 2006;
Leydesdorff, 2006; Ha¨ring and Storbeck, 2008). Social media have become highly successful and
influential. App Stores have created an ecosystem of millions of apps. Even when provided for
free, they can create considerable economic value. Furthermore, the “sharing economy” is currently
generating growth rates of 20%. So, participatory market societies have great potential.
Humanity has now the opportunity to enter an era of creativity and prosperity built on social
principles and enabled by modern ICT systems. It just takes a proper understanding of socionomic
systems to determine and establish suitable institutions such as open, user-centric, multi-criteria
reputation systems. In the past, humans have created institutions such as markets, roads, courts,
museums, schools, libraries, and universities to benefit our society and economy. It is now time
to create the right institutions for the information society, supporting socio-economic life in the
21st century. If the right decisions are made, these institutions will unleash the creativity of our
“networked minds”, thereby opening the door to an age of sustainable prosperity.
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economicus”), while it might be undermined by social influence (as it is characteristic for the “homo socialis”) (Lorenz
et al., 2011). However, the “homo socialis” seems to be better in dealing with social dilemma situations. So, both
kinds of behavior have their advantages and disadvantages, depending on the respective context.
39The reputation system will be described in more detail elsewhere. It may allow users to determine themselves
whether they want to share the reputation information about them with others and with whom. It should also
establish a suitable balance between traceable and anonymous (information or financial) exchange, thereby limiting
misuse of anonymity and stimulating responsible action on the one hand, while providing individual freedoms on the
other hand. Finally, the reputation system could include the feature of “forgetting” and “forgiving”.
40Andrew Haldane at the Bank of England puts it like this: “Modern finance is complex, perhaps too complex.
Regulation of modern finance is complex, almost certainly too complex. That configuration spells trouble. As you
do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with complexity. Because complexity generates uncertainty,
not risk, it requires a regulatory response grounded in simplicity, not complexity.” (Haldane and Madouros, 2012)
41This may be seen as a consequence of time scale separation, which is a precondition for power in hierarchical
systems (Helbing, 2013a, 2012). One may imagine the result of this process to be a “Swiss basic democracy plus”,
enabled by future ICT systems.
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